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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 16-2213 
______________ 
 
DAVID WILLIAM COLVIN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 2-15-cv-00515) 
District Judge: Hon. Donetta W. Ambrose 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 13, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.  
 
(Filed: January 18, 2017) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 David William Colvin appeals from the order of the District Court affirming the 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denying his application for disability 
insurance benefits (“DIBs”).  For the reasons set forth herein, we will affirm. 
I 
 Colvin filed an application for DIBs, alleging that a cervical neck fusion, lower 
lumbar stenosis, and brain tinnitus prevented him from working.  At a hearing before the 
ALJ, Colvin testified that his ailments caused him to suffer from neck pain, migraines, 
mobility issues, and strength depletion.  Despite these maladies, Colvin testified that he 
was able to perform light housework, take care of himself, drive, go out alone, pay bills, 
count change, and handle personal finances.     
In addition to Colvin’s testimony, the ALJ considered various medical records and 
the testimony of a vocational expert.  The records show, among other things, that during 
several examinations, Colvin was in no apparent distress, had normal neurologic 
function, only minimal physiologic limitations on his range of motion, full motor 
strength, and symmetric reflexes.  The records also include two conflicting functional 
capacity assessments.  Dr. Anthony Ricci, Colvin’s treating physician, reported that 
Colvin was permanently disabled and only capable of occasionally lifting or carrying two 
and half pounds, standing and or walking for three hours during an eight-hour workday, 
and sitting about three hours during an eight-hour workday.  Dr. Paul Reardon, a state 
agency consultant who did not personally examine Colvin but reviewed his records, 
found that Colvin was not disabled and was capable of occasionally lifting or carrying 20 
pounds, standing and or walking for four hours in an eight-hour workday, and sitting for 
about six hours in an eight-hour workday.  A vocational expert testified that Colvin 
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retains the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work and is capable of 
performing several jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy.     
 Based on this evidence, the ALJ concluded that Colvin had several severe 
impairments,1 including degenerative disc disease with bilateral radiculopathy, hip 
bursitis, fibromyalgia, hypertension, and brain tinnitus, but that his “statements 
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [his] symptoms are not 
entirely credible,” App. 19-20, and his treatment history was not commensurate with a 
condition of the severity which he alleged.  The ALJ further determined that Colvin 
retained the capacity to work, that jobs exist that he can perform, and, accordingly, that 
he was not entitled to DIBs.  The District Court affirmed.  Colvin appeals. 
II2 
 We exercise plenary review over the ALJ’s determination of legal issues, Chandler 
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011), and review the ALJ’s factual 
findings and final determination under the deferential “substantial evidence” standard, 42 
U.S.C.  § 405(g); Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.”  Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 
2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  It is “more than a mere scintilla 
but may be somewhat less than a preponderance of the evidence.”  Id. (internal quotation 
                                              
 1 A “severe impairment” is demonstrated by showing “any impairment or 
combination of impairments which significantly limits [a claimant’s] physical or mental 
ability to do basic work activities.”  20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. 
 2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
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marks and citation omitted).  If, upon review of the record as a whole, Schaudeck, 181 
F.3d at 431, we determine that the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, 
we are bound by those findings even if we would have decided the inquiry differently, 
Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). 
III 
 We conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that 
Colvin was not disabled.  The record shows, among other things, that, despite his various 
medical problems, Colvin is capable of performing light housework, taking care of 
himself, driving, going out alone, handling personal finances, occasionally lifting or 
carrying 20 pounds, standing and or walking for four hours in an eight-hour workday, 
sitting for about six hours in an eight-hour workday, and that he could perform sedentary 
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy,  Thus, substantial evidence 
supports the ALJ’s findings. 
 Colvin’s argument that the ALJ failed to consider the opinion of Dr. Ricci, 
Colvin’s treating physician who determined that Colvin was “permanently disabled,” and 
improperly afforded greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Reardon, the state consultant 
who reviewed the record and found that Colvin did not have functional limitations that 
precluded him from working, is unavailing.  While “[t]reating physicians’ reports should 
be accorded great weight,” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999), “the 
opinion of a treating physician does not bind the ALJ on the issue of functional capacity,” 
Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 196 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Adorno v. Shalala, 40 
F.3d 43, 47-48 (3d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that a “statement by a plaintiff’s treating 
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physician supporting an assertion that [plaintiff] is disabled or unable to work is not 
dispositive of the issue” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).  Instead, the 
ALJ may assign a treating physician’s opinion more or less weight depending upon the 
extent to which the physician’s assessment is supported by the record.  Plummer, 186 
F.3d at 429.  Here, the ALJ reviewed Colvin’s medical records and the opinions of 
physicians and acted within her discretion to assign less weight to Dr. Ricci’s opinion 
because: (1) Dr. Ricci’s permanent disability diagnosis was set forth in a checkbox form 
unaccompanied by any explanation, which we have held to be “weak evidence at best,” 
Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993); and (2) Dr. Ricci’s opinion was 
not supported by the medical records, which actually showed that, during several 
examinations conducted by both Ricci and other physicians Colvin was in no apparent 
distress and had only minimal physiologic limitations on range of motion, normal 
neurologic function, full motor strength, and symmetric reflexes.  Therefore, the ALJ did 
not err in according Dr. Ricci’s opinion less weight.   
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
